New Jersey Supreme Court Recognizes Potential Disability Discrimination Claim Based on Medicinal Marijuana Use
December 6, 2020
By: Stephen B. Stern
In Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc., 224 A.3d 1206 (N.J. 2020), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (“Compassionate Use Act”) does not preclude a disability discrimination claim brought under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”).
In Wild, Justin Wild began working for Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc. (“Carriage”), in 2013 as a licensed funeral director. In 2015, he was diagnosed with cancer and, as part of his treatment, he was prescribed marijuana under the Compassionate Use Act. In May 2016, a vehicle ran a stop sign and struck the vehicle Wild was operating while he was performing his duties for a funeral. Wild was hospitalized and, while at the hospital, he informed the treating physician that he had a license to possess medical marijuana. The doctor in turn told Wild that “it was clear [Wild] was not under the influence of marijuana, and therefore no blood tests were required.” David Feeney, one of Carriage’s employees, however, told Wild he would need a test to return to work. The following week, Wild worked a funeral and, several days later, Feeney told Wild that “corporate” was unable to “handle” his marijuana use and his employment was “being terminated because they found drugs in [Wild’s] system.” In a June 3, 2016 letter, however, “corporate” informed Wild that he was not being terminated from employment because of drug use, but because he failed to disclose his use of medication, which adversely affected his ability to perform his job duties.
Wild filed suit alleging, among other things, that he was terminated in violation of the LAD. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding the Compassionate Use Act “does not contain employment-related protections for licensed users of medical marijuana.” The appellate division reversed the decision of the trial court, finding that Wild alleged he had a disability that qualified him to use medicinal marijuana and the LAD makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer because of the . . . disability . . . of any individual . . . to discharge . . . or to discriminate against such individual . . . in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment . . . unless the nature and extent of the disability reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment.” Although the appellate court ruled in Wild’s favor, it rejected Wild’s argument that the Compassionate Use Act conflicted with the LAD, noting that the Compassionate Use Act expressly stated that “[n]othing in this act shall be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace.” The appellate court explained that this provision of the Compassionate Use Act “can mean only one thing” – that “the Compassionate Use Act intended to cause no impact on existing employment rights[,]” meaning the “Compassionate Use Act neither created new employment rights nor destroyed existing employment rights.” Ultimately, the appellate court determined that the matter before it was whether the plaintiff (Wild) sufficiently alleged a cause of action under the LAD. The appellate court rejected the defendants’ argument that Wild failed to even allege they were aware of his claimed disability, finding that Wild “more than adequately . . . allege[d] this necessary aspect of his LAD claims.” The appellate court further noted that, although the Compassionate Use Act does not require an employer to accommodate medical marijuana use in the workplace, it “does not mean that the LAD does not impose such an obligation, particularly when the declination of an accommodation to such a user relates only to use ‘in any workplace.’” This was an important distinction to the appellate court because, as it explained, the plaintiff “alleged only that he sought an accommodation that would allow his continued use of medical marijuana ‘off-site’ or during ‘off-work hours.’”
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court and concluded that “at the pleading stage of this case, in which the facts have yet to be developed and plaintiff is entitled to every reasonable inference of fact, plaintiff has stated a claim sufficient to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss.” The New Jersey Supreme Court further noted that it affirmed the decision of the appellate court “substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Fisher’s thoughtful published opinion[,]” but added some commentary about the interplay between the Compassionate Use Act and LAD.
Specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted it agreed with the appellate court that there is no conflict between the Compassionate Use Act and the LAD. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court’s conclusion, however, that the Compassionate Use Act intended to have no impact on existing employment rights. To this end, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that Wild’s LAD disability discrimination claim was based on his assertion that he lawfully used marijuana outside the workplace that was prescribed for him as part of his “medical treatment [and] pain management.” The court then noted that, had the New Jersey Legislature not enacted the Compassionate Use Act, Wild would not have been eligible to use marijuana outside the workplace and he would have no claim under the LAD for disability discrimination, both in terms of his alleged discriminatory termination from employment and failure to accommodate. As such, the Compassionate Use Act did have an impact on the plaintiff’s existing employment rights.
The New Jersey Supreme Court then proceeded to cite two specific provisions of the Compassionate Use Act and noted that they can affect claims under the LAD. First, the court cited the provision that states “[n]othing in [this statute] shall be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace.” Second, the court cited the provision that states the statute “shall not be construed to permit a person to . . . operate, navigate or be in actual physical control of any vehicle, aircraft, railroad train, stationary heavy equipment or vessel while under the influence of marijuana.”
The court’s decision in Wild is significant because it is another example of the growing number of states that recognize medicinal marijuana statutes may create protections for employees under employment statutes and require employers to provide reasonable accommodations and not discriminate against employees for such use of marijuana.