News & Insights

Maryland Supreme Court Clarifies Rights Regarding Commercial Evictions

May 4, 2026

By: Patrick W. Daley

     The Supreme Court of Maryland issued a significant decision on April 29, 2026 in Kapneck 14-16, LLC v. Bkeezy's Speakeasy, LLC, that is likely to reshape certain issues that arise in summary ejection actions involving commercial lease disputes.  In particular, the ruling addressed two critical issues: (1) whether a commercial tenant can waive the statutory right of redemption; and (2) what constitutes “due and unpaid” rent in the context of additional charges.

     In the commercial lease context, tenants often have a “right of redemption,” which allows a tenant to terminate an eviction proceeding by paying the landlord all past due rent and related fees, such as late fees and attorneys’ fees.  In Kapneck, the Maryland Supreme Court examined § 1-104 of the Maryland Real Property Article and waiver of the right of redemption does not violate Maryland public policy and held that a commercial tenant may contractually waive its statutory right of redemption.  In reaching this conclusion, the Maryland Supreme Court distinguished its prior decision in Copinol Restaurant, Inc. v. 26 North Market LLC, 491 Md. 246 (2025), where the Court determined that a waiver of redemption rights affects only the post-judgment consequences of a summary ejectment, not the statutory elements required to bring an action.  Among other things, the Court also relied on the principle that parties generally are free to vary or otherwise deviate from statutory rights through contractual terms, unless the statute expressly prohibits the waiver of such rights.  As a result, a properly drafted commercial lease provision can waive a tenant’s redemption rights and will be enforced.  This outcome highlights a notable distinction between residential leases and commercial leases, as such waivers are barred in residential leases by § 8-208 of the Maryland Real Property Article.

     After addressing waiver of the right of redemption, the Maryland Supreme Court turned to the statutory notice provision found in § 8-401(c)(1) of the Maryland Real Property Article.  Pursuant to § 8-401(c)(1), a landlord must provide written notice of its intent to file a complaint “to recover possession of [a] residential premises.” (emphasis added by the Court).  Relying on the express and unambiguous terms of the statutory provision, the Court (not surprisingly) held that the pre-suit notice requirement found in the statute applies only to residential tenancies, not commercial leases.  The Court did not end its analysis there, however, and it imposed an important limitation on landlords that want to reclaim possession of properties.  In this regard, the Maryland Supreme Court held that a landlord may seek summary ejectment only for amounts that are truly “due and unpaid.”  To meet this standard of being “due and unpaid,” a tenant must have: (1) prior notice of the nature and amount of the charges that are due; and (2) the full contractual time to pay under the lease.  To this end, the Court determined that a charge cannot be “due” unless a tenant is aware of it.  In other words, rent must be “definitely ascertained” for a court to find eviction of a commercial tenant is warranted, and charges first disclosed after filing suit cannot form the basis of a summary ejectment action.  In this regard, the Court effectively imposed some pre-suit notice required on landlords for summary ejectment proceedings.

     Related to its analysis of the pre-suit notice provision, the Court also undertook an analysis of “additional rent” and whether it was “due and unpaid” in the case before it.  In this regard, with respect to water and sewer charges, the Court determined that they must be billed within a reasonable timeframe (e.g., shortly after receipt) to be included as “additional rent.”  As for attorneys’ fees, the Court held that landlords must disclose both the nature and amount of such fees before they become collectible as “additional rent.”  Similarly, for late fees to be collectible as “additional rent,” late fees must be properly demanded, particularly where the landlord’s course of conduct suggests discretion.  In short, in order to collect any sums (and to proceed with the summary eviction proceeding), landlords cannot rely on after-the-fact accounting to justify eviction.

     The Maryland Supreme Court’s decision in Kapneck is significant for multiple reasons, both to commercial landlords and commercial tenants. For landlords, they want to (1) ensure lease provisions clearly and expressly waive redemption rights if that is what the landlord intends, the intent, (2) implement consistent and timely billing practices for all items that constitute additional rent, (3) and provide timely, documented notice of all charges before filing suit.  For tenants, they want to (a) carefully review and comprehend lease provisions that waive statutory rights, (b) track and dispute additional rent charges promptly upon receipt (if warranted), and (c) be aware that failure to receive advance notice of charges may provide a defense to eviction.  And, beyond the commercial lease context, the Maryland Supreme Court’s decision in Kapneck serves as an important reminder about two widely (although not universally) applicable legal principles in Maryland – that being the freedom to enter into contract terms that are agreeable to the parties and providing proper notice to parties.